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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TIFFANY JACOBS DINNER, 
: BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
: 20030330-CA 
vs. 
ERICH ROSS DINNER, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
AN APPEAL FROM FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER (3/25/2003), BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, 
The Hon. Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding. 
(Trial Court Case No. 98-490-1948 DA) 
Respondent/Appellant, Erich Diener, by and through counsel, 
submits the following brief: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (1953 as amended) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1) Whether the evidence presented at the 2003 trial on 
Erich Diener's petition to modify supports the trial court's 
findings that the parties entered into an "agreement" at the time 
of the 1998 divorce regarding child support. Whether the 
evidence presented at trial supports the trial court's findings 
that there was a bargained-for exchange regarding child support 
at the time of divorce. If so, what are the terms of this 
agreement? 
2) Whether the trial court's factual findings support the 
conclusions of law denying Erich Diener's request to adjust his 
child support obligation. 
3) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to apply Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(6) (1953 as amended) and the right to a 
recalculation of child support after three (3) years passage from 
the date of a decree regardless of any change in circumstances of 
the parties. 
4) Whether the trial court erred in finding "no substantial 
change in circumstances upon which to justify modification of the 
child support" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(7) (1953 as 
amended). 
5) Whether the trial court erred in its narrow application 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(7) (1953 as amended) solely to Mr. 
Diener's financial circumstances and not to the overall change in 
both parties' circumstances. 
6) Did the trial court misconstrue Mr. Diener's stipulation 
regarding amounts to be used for the child support calculation? 
2 
7) Is it ever in the child's best interest to reduce child 
support? 
ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED 
The foregoing issues were raised in Mr. Diener's Petition to 
Modify Decree (R. 43), Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 62), Trial 
Memorandum (R. 153), at trial (Transcript), Defendant's 
Additional Requested Findings of Fact and Objections (R. 167) and 
Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Findings of Fact (R. 184). 
The issues were considered and ruled upon by the court in 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order1 (R. 202). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1) The trial court's findings of fact in a divorce action 
are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Kessimakis v. 
Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). The trial 
court, however, must have made adequately detailed findings on 
each issue so that the Court of Appeals can determine if those 
findings were rationally based upon applicable factors. 
Williamson v. Williamson, 3 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 4 6 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999) . 
2) The conclusions of law that flow from the findings are 
reviewed for correctness and are given no special deference on 
1
 Defendant's objections were partially overruled in a 
minute entry (R. 181) and in a hand written denial on the last 
page of the 3/25/2003 Order (R. 209). 
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appeal. Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1126, 1228 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999); Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). Correctness "means the appellate court decides that 
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial 
judge's determination of law." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1) The parties were divorced in a stipulated decree entered 
on April 17, 1998. Decree (R. 33). 
2) There was one (1) child born during the marriage, Zoe-
Nicene Lois Diener, dob 2/19/1995. Decree, p. 2 (R. 34). 
3) In the decree, Erich Diener was ordered to pay $4 00.00 
per month for child support to petitioner/appellee Tiffany Diener 
for the parties' one (1) child. The child support exceeded the 
Utah Child Support Guidelines. Decree, p. 2 (R. 34). 
4) Erich Diener filed a Petition to Modify the Divorce 
Decree on December 4, 2001. Petition to Modify (R. 43). 
5) Erich Diener sought a reduction in child support, a 
change in the requirements regarding life insurance, a 
termination of the requirement for the parties to contribute to a 
college fund for the child, and the right to claim the child for 
alternate tax years. Petition to Modify Decree, p. 2-4 (R. 44-
46) . 
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6) More than three (3) years had elapsed since the entry of 
the decree at the time Mr. Diener filed his Petition to Modify. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, dated 3/25/2003, 
p. 2 (R. 203). 
7) The Petitioner/Appellee Tiffany Diener moved the court 
to dismiss (R. 50). Mr. Diener moved for summary judgment (R. 
62). Both motions were denied on our about April 1, 2002. Order 
Denying Motion to Dismiss (R. 90). 
8) The matter came before the court for trial on February 
6, 2003. 
9) Based upon that trial, the court issued an Order dated 
March 25, 2003, entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, dated 3/25/2003 (hereinafter "3/25/2003 Order")(attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B"; see also R. 202). 
10) The court: 
Denied Mr. Diener's Petition to Modify the child support. 
3/25/2003 Order, p. 7 (R. 208). 
Denied Mr. Diener's Petition to Modify the tax deduction as 
to Mr. Diener's request to alternate tax years.2 3/25/2003 
Order, p. 7 (R. 208). 
2
 The Court did order that Mr. Diener could purchase the 
right to claim the child for tax purposes but declined to 
establish a procedure to do so. 
5 
Granted the request to suspend the requirement that the 
parties contribute to a college fund for the child. 3/25/2003 
Order, p. 7 (R. 208). 
Granted the request regarding the maintenance of life 
insurance (each party is now only required to obtain such 
insurance only if it is available through the parties' employers 
at a reasonable cost). 3/25/2003 Order, p. 7 (R. 208). 
11) This timely appeal followed. Notice of Appeal (R. 
210) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. GENERAL FACTS: 
1. The parties were granted a divorce on April 17, 1998. 
Decree of Divorce (hereinafter "Decree") (R. 33), Trial 
Transcript, p. 4 (hereinafter "Transcript"; the transcript of the 
2003 trial on Erich Diener's Petition to Modify is found in the 
record on appeal beginning at R. 220) . 
2. One child was born during the marriage. The child's 
name and date of birth are: 
Zoe-Nicene Lois Diener, February 19, 1995. 
Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, p. 1 (R. 1), Decree, p. 2 
(R. 34). 
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3. The decree of divorce set child support "in the amount 
of $400.00 per month . . . ." Decree, p. 2 (R. 34) That amount 
exceeded the Utah Support Guidelines. Decree, p. 2 (R. 34/ see 
also Transcript, p. 17). The Decree and the Findings set out no 
reason why the amount exceeds the Guidelines (R. 2 6 & 33). 
II• FACTS RE: INCREASED CHILD SUPPORT AS A BARGAINED-FOR-
EXCHANGE: 
The Court in the 2003 modification proceeding made the 
following finding: 
The higher child support amount was a bargained-for 
consideration where each of the parties made significant 
concessions in reaching that agreement. Ms. Diener 
agreed not to pursue claims for alimony or additional 
property settlement, based upon Mr. Diener's use of Ms. 
Diener's pre-marital assets, and Mr. Diener agreed to pay 
a higher monthly child support amount in order to be 
relieved of the risk of such claims by Ms. Diener being 
successful. 
3/25/2003 Order, p. 2 (R. 203) .3 The court then concluded "it 
would be inequitable to apply to provisions of § 78-45-7.2(6), 
Utah Code, to reduce Mr. Diener's child support obligation, 
inasmuch as doing so would provide Mr. Diener with the benefits 
of the bargain without requiring its corresponding obligations." 
3/25/2003 Order, p. 5 (R. 206). 
3
 Discussed more fully below, none of the additional 
findings support this finding. Rather, the additional findings 
support Mr. Diener's allegation that there has been a substantial 
change to the parties' circumstances. 
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There was no finding in the original Findings of Fact in 
1998 supporting the decree with regard to any such bargain (see 
R. 2 6) . There is no indication of any such bargain in the 
parties' Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (see R. 10). 
Finally, there is no indication of any such bargain in the 
parties' Decree of Divorce (see R. 33). 
A. TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF THE COURT'S FINDING 
(MARSHALING REQUIREMENT): 
1. Tiffany Diener was aware that the child support amount 
ordered in the Decree was higher than the amount provided by the 
Utah Child Support Guidelines. Transcript, p. 5. 
2. Erich Diener testified, "I am aware that the divorce 
decree required I pay $400.00 a month in child support." 
Transcript, p. 17. He testified, "At some time during the entire 
proceedings I know I must have become aware of the fact that it 
was more." Transcript, p. 38. 
3. Erich consulted with a JAG attorney while stationed at 
Fort Meade, Maryland in the Fall of 1997 regarding divorce. 
Erich was not represented by counsel at the time of the divorce 
decree or in the original proceeding. Transcript, p. 4 & 16. 
4. Erich told Tiffany that he did not want her to pursue a 
claim for alimony. Transcript, p. 35. 
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5. There was approximately $110,000.00 in Tiffany's trust 
account when she reached the age of majority in 1992, two (2) 
years before the parties' marriage. Transcript, p. 35, 57. 
6. Prior to the marriage, Tiffany bought Erich a used 1970 
a Toyota Land Cruiser. The value of the vehicle was 
approximately $2,000.00 to $2,400.00. Transcript, p. 35, 51-52 & 
57. The vehicle was purchased in 1993, whereas the parties were 
married on July 2, 1994. Transcript, p. 62. 
7. Before the parties' marriage, Tiffany paid a portion of 
Erich's tuition while he attended Harvard University for one (1) 
semester. Transcript, p. 36. 
8. Erich attended Harvard University for one (1) semester 
in 1992 right after high school. Tiffany paid $5,000.00 toward 
tuition and airfare on behalf of Erich. Transcript, p. 55-56. 
9. Tiffany characterized the $5,000.00 as a loan that was 
"an investment in him and our future together." Transcript, p. 
56 & 61. She testified, uWe had talked about marriage, and he 
had said that he would make it up to me." Transcript, p. 56. 
10. Tiffany testified that the 1970 Land Cruiser was not a 
gift. She testified that when the vehicle was sold, Erich gave 
her half of the sales price, $1,200.00. Transcript, p. 56-57. 
11. Tiffany testified that in early 1998 the parties spoke 
extensively about the terms of the pending divorce. Transcript, 
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p. 58. Erich's testimony does not dispute this assertion. 
Transcript, p. 34. 
12. Tiffany testified that Erich Diener brought up the 
amount of $400.00 in child support. Transcript, p. 58-59. 
Erich's testimony does not dispute this assertion. Transcript, 
p. 34. Responding to the proposed amount child support, Tiffany 
testified, "I laughed. I said that's ridiculous with all that he 
owed me. I said, 'If I still had my trust fund, I would - - I 
could live off much more than that just from the interest.'" 
Transcript, p. 59. 
13. Tiffany testified, "I discussed both alimony and 
property claims. [Erich Diener] wanted me not to pursue those in 
exchange for a higher amount of child support." Transcript, p. 
59. 
14. Tiffany did not make a claim for alimony in the divorce 
action. Transcript, p. 38.4 
4
 The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (R. 10) 
specifically decline alimony: "This is a brief marriage of 3-1/2 
years duration. The parties are able-bodied and able to provide 
for their own support and neither shall pay alimony to the 
other." Stipulation, p. 4 (R. 13). The original Findings of 
Fact reads identical (R.*< 29) . Finally, the Decree of Divorce 
declines alimony. Decree, p. 3 (R. 35). 
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15. If Erich is permitted to reduce child support from 
$400.00, Tiffany will seek to assert claims for alimony and/or 
property settlement. Transcript, p. 60. 
B. THE FOLLOWING TESTIMONY/EVIDENCE DETRACTS FROM THE 
COURT'S FINDING: 
16. Tiffany was represented by counsel at the time of the 
divorce decree. Transcript, p. 4 & 16. Erich was not. 
Transcript, p. 4 & 16. 
17. The marital debts listed in the Divorce Decree totaled 
approximately $11,400.00. Decree, p. 4 (R. 36). Of those, 
Tiffany was ordered to pay $3,350.00. Transcript, p. 9; Decree, 
p. 4 (R. 36). Erich was ordered to pay the remaining balance. 
Id. 
18. There is no mention or indication of pre-marital debts 
(if indeed such existed) in the decree. See Decree (R. 36); 
Transcript, p. 9. 
19. There is no mention of any debts (if indeed such 
existed), that Erich owed to Tiffany in the decree. Transcript, 
p. 9. 
20. Erich testified that he did not use Tiffany's trust 
account. Transcript, p. 35. 
21. Before the parties' marriage on July 2, 1994, Tiffany's 
trust account was entirely depleted. Transcript, p. 48, 5 7 & 63. 
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22. Erich testified that the used 1970 Land Cruiser was a 
gift. Transcript, p. 49-50. He was not present when the vehicle 
was purchased. Transcript, p. 51-52. 
23. Tiffany testified that Erich gave $1,200.00 to Tiffany 
at the time he sold the vehicle. Transcript, p. 57. Erich 
testified that he did not recall ("I don't know. I don't know if 
I gave her any . . . . " ) . Transcript, p. 52. 
24. The used Land Cruiser was purchased prior to the 
parties' marriage. Transcript, p. 62. 
25. There is no mention of the Land Cruiser or a related 
debt in the decree. Transcript, p. 62-63. 
26. Erich had no discussions with Tiffany in negotiations 
for settlement of the divorce regarding increased child support 
in exchange for waiver of alimony. Transcript, p. 42-43. 
27. Rather, Erich testified, "I . . . said not to worry too 
much that she didn't have [the trust fund] anymore because . . . 
at the time . . . I wanted to be a doctor." Transcript, p. 43. 
These statements were made by Erich prior to and during the 
marriage, not at the time of the divorce. Id. 
28. The money that Tiffany paid to help Erich attend 
Harvard for a semester was an "investment in [the parties'] 
future." Transcript, p. 61. 
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29. There is no mention of the "Harvard" money in the 
decree. Transcript, p. 62. 
30. The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (R. 10), 
original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 26) and 
Decree (R. 33) all implicitly deny alimony. The Decree reads, 
"The parties are able-bodied and able to provide for their own 
support, and it is ordered that neither party pay alimony to the 
other." Decree, p. 3 (R. 35). 
III. FACTS RE: SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES: 
A. CHANGE IN ERICH DIENER'S CIRCUMSTANCES: 
1. At the time of the divorce Erich was in the military. 
Transcript, p. 4-5, 16. Throughout the marriage, Erich was in 
the United States Army. Transcript, p. 17. 
2. Erich's base monthly income at the time of the divorce 
was $1,192.00. Transcript, p. 17. In addition, to the base 
income, Erich received a housing allowance. Transcript, p. 17. 
With the housing allowance, Erich's income was approximately 
$1,700.00 per month. Transcript, p. 17-18. Thus, the divorce 
decree reflected income of $1,700.00 per month for Erich. 
Transcript, p. 18. 
3. Erich was discharged from the military in April 1998. 
Transcript, p. 9, 17-18. 
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4. From April until about June of 1998, Erich was employed 
by Circuit City as a salesman earning $1,200.00 gross per month. 
Transcript, p. 18. 
5. From June 1998 until September 2001, Erich was employed 
by TEKsystems. Transcript, p. 18-19. 
6. When first employed, Erich earned $12.00 per hour for 
TEKsystems. When Erich was terminated, he was earning $55,000.00 
annually. Transcript, p. 19. 
7. Erich's termination with TEKsystems in 2001 was the 
result of a reduction in force. Transcript, p. 19. 
8. Erich was unable to find employment in the same field. 
Erich looked repeatedly for work in said field. Erich did not 
qualify for such employment in the constricted job market. The 
jobs for which Erich did apply, required a Bachelor's Degree. 
Transcript, p, 19-21. 
9. Erich returned to college shortly after being laid off 
from TEKsystems. Transcript, p. 21 & 28. 
10. Erich was employed at Tucci's Italian Restaurant from 
November 2001 to October/September 2002. Erich was a bartender 
and waiter. He worked shifts that would enable him to attend 
college. Transcript, p. 21-22. 
11. Erich's average income at Tucci's was $10.00 per hour. 
Erich worked approximately twenty to thirty (20-30) hours per 
14 
week at Tucci's. Transcript, p. 22. Erich terminated his 
employment in September 2002 with Tucci's. Transcript, p. 22. 
12. During 2002, Erich temporarily worked part-time again 
for TEKsystems from May 2002 until about October 2002. Erich was 
paid $2 0.00 per hour for this limited work, for a total amount of 
about $3,655.00 in 2002. Transcript, p. 24. 
13. After October 2002, TEKsystems did not offer Erich any 
other employment. Transcript, p. 24. 
14. Erich has provided computer assistance to Brian 
Barnard's law office, his counsel in this matter, in exchange for 
attorney fees. The total amount credited for 2001 and 2002 was 
$1,200.00 and $1,912.50 respectively. Transcript, p. 25. 
15. Erich enlisted in the National Guard in September 2002, 
with an obligation of one (1) weekend a month and two (2) weeks 
each summer. Erich's compensation from the National Guard is 
approximately $250.00 per month. Transcript, p. 26. 
16. At the time of trial, Erich was employed part-time at 
The Gateway Academy, a residential treatment center for teenage 
boys. Erich earns approximately $10.00 per hour and works about 
24 hours a week on the graveyard shift. Transcript, p. 2 6-27. 
Erich does not have any fringe benefits available to him through 
that employment. Transcript, p. 27. 
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17. Erich is currently a full-time student at the 
University of Utah working towards a Bachelor's Degree. 
Transcript, p. 28. His anticipated graduation is Spring of 2004. 
Transcript, p. 29. 
18. While attending the University of Utah, Erich has 
incurred student loans of about $13,000.00. Transcript, p. 50. 
Those student loans have been utilized by Erich to attend school, 
pay bills, and to meet other current living expenses. 
Transcript, p. 50. 
B. CHANGE IN TIFFANY DIENER'S CIRCUMSTANCES: 
19. At the time of the divorce, Tiffany was employed as a 
nanny. Transcript, p. 5. 
20. At the time of the divorce, Tiffany earned $1,192.00 
per month. Transcript, p. 6. Tiffany also received at no cost 
room and board for herself and the parties' daughter. 
Transcript, p. 6. 
21. Tiffany is currently unemployed. Transcript, p. 7. 
She has been unemployed since quitting the above nanny job in 
June of 2 001. Transcript, p. 7. 
22. Tiffany is currently a full-time student at the 
University of Utah. Transcript, p. 7-8. 
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23. Tiffany does not have any disability or physical 
impairment that would prevent her from working. Transcript, p. 
8-9. 
24. The parties' child is a normal, healthy child who 
attends full time traditional school. Transcript, p. 10. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred in denying Erich Diener's petition to 
modify the decree to adjust child support. Erich Diener is 
entitled to an adjustment of child support based upon the passage 
of three (3) years and the non-temporary difference of 10%. 
Those who owe child support are entitled to a review and an 
adjustment once every three (3) years if there is a difference of 
10% or more between the amount previously ordered and the 
recalculated amount under the guidelines. There is no 
requirement of a substantial change in the parties circumstances 
to effect this change. 
The lower court erred in finding a bargained-for exchange of 
alimony for increased child support. The evidence presented, and 
the original divorce documents, do not support such a finding. 
There is no indication of said bargain in the original divorce 
documents (Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (R. 10), Findings 
of Fact (R. 29), and Decree of Divorce (R. 33)). The fact that 
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there is no suggestion of such a bargain in the original divorce 
documents is fatal to Tiffany Diener's current assertion that the 
parties entered into a pre-divorce agreement. 
The lower court erred in failing to find a substantial 
change in the parties' circumstances. Utah law allows an 
adjustment to child support based upon a substantial change to 
the parties circumstances. If the court finds such a change, it 
must determine whether the change results in a difference of 15% 
or more between the amount of child support ordered and the 
amount that would be required under the guidelines. If there is 
such a difference, the court shall adjust the amount of child 
support to that which is provided for in the guidelines. 
Erich Diener's situation has substantially changed. Tiffany 
Diener's situation has substantially changed. In addition, the 
trial court erred in solely examining Erich Diener's financial 
circumstances, and not the overall change in both parties' 
circumstances. 
The best interests of the child can be met by a reduction of 
child support. Erich Diener is neither voluntarily unemployed, 
nor voluntarily underemployed. The trial court specifically 
found that Mr. Diener requires a college degree to obtain gainful 
employment at a reasonable rate of pay. Erich Diener's decision 
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to return to school will ultimately benefit the child by 
providing greater earning capacity. 
Finally, an injustice will be perpetrated if the trial 
court's ruling is allowed to stand. Assuming arguendo that Erich 
Diener indeed incurred an obligation to Tiffany Diener prior to 
the marriage, at some point it will be repaid through the 
increased support. After repayment, Tiffany Diener will be 
unjustly enriched by continued, excessive child support. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING ERICH DIENER'S REQUEST TO 
MODIFY CHILD SUPPORT. ERICH DIENER IS ENTITLED TO AN ADJUSTMENT 
IN CHILD SUPPORT PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THREE 
(3) YEARS: 
Erich Diener is entitled to an adjustment of child support 
based upon the passage of three (3) years and the non-temporary 
difference of 10%. Under Utah law, those who owe an obligation 
of, or receive, child support are entitled to a review and an 
adjustment once every three (3) years if there is a difference of 
10% or more between the amount previously ordered and the 
recalculated amount under the guidelines. There is no 
requirement of a substantial change in the parties' circumstances 
to effect this change. The pertinent statute reads as follows: 
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(6) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or 
modified within the previous three years, a parent, legal 
guardian, or the office may petition the court to adjust 
the amount of a child support order. 
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (6) (a) , 
the court shall, taking into account the best interests 
of the child, determine whether there is a difference 
between the amount ordered and the amount that would be 
required under the guidelines. If there is a difference 
of 10% or more and the difference is not of a temporary 
nature, the court shall adjust the amount to that which 
is provided for in the guidelines. 
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is 
not necessary for an adjustment under Subsection (6) (b) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (a)- (c) (1953 as amended). The 
statute mandates an adjustment to child support if the 10% 
criteria is met: "If there is a difference of 10% or more and 
the difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall 
adjust the amount to that which is provided for in the 
guidelines." Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, in light of the passage of three (3) years from the 
date the decree was entered herein, the court below erred by 
refusing to recalculate child support pursuant to the guidelines 
and order Erich Diener to pay the resulting amount. 
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING A BARGAINED-FOR EXCHANGE OF 
ALIMONY FOR INCREASED CHILD SUPPORT. 
The lower court found that 
The higher child support amount was a bargained-for 
consideration where each of the parties made significant 
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concessions in reaching that agreement. Ms. Diener 
agreed not to pursue claims for alimony or additional 
property settlement, based upon Mr. Diener's use of Ms. 
Diener's pre-marital assets, and Mr. Diener agreed to pay 
a higher monthly child support amount in order to be 
relieved of the risk of such claims by Ms. Diener being 
successful. 
3/25/2003 Order, p. 2 (R. 203) . 
The court concluded "it would be inequitable to apply to 
provisions of § 78-45-7.2(6), Utah Code, to reduce Mr. Diener's 
child support obligation, inasmuch as doing so would provide Mr. 
Diener with the benefits of the bargain without requiring its 
corresponding obligations." 3/25/2003 Order, p. 5 (R. 206). 
The evidence presented, and the original divorce documents, 
do not support such a finding. There was no finding in the 1998 
Findings of Fact with regard to any such bargain (see R. 2 6). 
There is no indication of any such bargain in the parties' 
Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (see R. 10). Finally, there 
is no indication of any such bargain in the parties' Decree of 
Divorce (see R. 33). None of these documents mention this 
"agreement." Indeed, the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement 
(R. 10) specifically denies alimony: "This is a brief marriage 
of 3-1/2 years duration. The parties are able-bodied and able to 
provide for their own support and neither shall pay alimony to 
the other." Stipulation, p. 4 (R. 13). The Findings of Fact 
reads identical (R. 29). Finally, the Decree of Divorce 
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specifically denies alimony. Decree, p. 3 (R. 35)("The parties 
are able-bodied and able to provide for their own support, and it 
is ordered that neither party pay alimony to the other"). 
There was no basis for an award of alimony at the time of 
the original decree. Given the parties' ages, health, earning 
abilities, and the duration of the marriage, an alimony award, if 
made, would have been for a short period of time and in a very 
modest amount. Tiffany Diener's potential claim for alimony was 
so slight as to be inconsequential. 
In consideration of the Petition to Modify, the trial court 
relied solely upon the ad hoc, post divorce recollection of 
Tiffany Diener to find the agreement. The fact that there is no 
suggestion of such a bargain in the Settlement Stipulation, 
Findings of Fact, and the Decree of Divorce is fatal to Tiffany 
Diener's ad hoc assertion that the parties entered into a pre-
divorce agreement. Instruction is found in the case Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). In that case, the appellant 
claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly distributed 
certain property. In its review, the Utah Supreme Court noted 
that findings of fact generally must include valuation of assets 
in order to permit appellate review. In the Jones case, however, 
trial counsel for the party appealing "prepared . . . inadequate 
findings of fact . . . conclusions of law and decree of divorce, 
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all of which the court entered without alteration." Id. at 1074. 
The Supreme Court declined to upset the property distribution, 
concluding appellant's claim had been waived because the party 
seeking review/reversal failed to adequately prepare the findings 
of fact, etc. IcL at 1074-75. 
By analogy, the same is true herein. Tiffany Diener seeks 
to establish and then enforce an "agreement" that was nowhere 
delineated in the original Stipulation and Settlement Agreement 
(R. 10), Findings of Fact (R. 26) and Decree of Divorce (R. 
33) .5 These documents were prepared by Tiffany Diener's trial 
counsel. Any questions as to construction, should be resloved 
against Ms. Diener. Any failures therein should be construed 
against Ms. Diener. By failing include any terms (if indeed they 
ever existed) of the parties' alleged agreement, Ms. Diener 
waived her right to assert such a claim. The failure to include 
such terms is fatal to Ms. Diener's current claim otherwise.6 
5
 Similarly, the original divorce papers contain no mention 
of the 1970 Land Cruiser, the "Harvard" money, or any pre-marital 
debts (if indeed any such existed). 
6
 The error is compounded by the recent judicial review. 
Herein, the lower court fails to find and/or delineate any 
specifics of the parties alleged agreement. 
What are the terms of the increased support agreement 
between the parties which supposedly formed the basis of the 
original settlement stipulation and decree? Neither the original 
decree nor the recent findings recite the terms of this 
agreement. Did Erich agree to pay increased child support until 
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The trial court erred in finding a bargained-for exchange of 
higher child support for alimony. 
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE IN THE PARTIES' CIRCUMSTANCES: 
The lower court made the following Conclusion of Law 
Because the Defendant's financial circumstances have 
not changed substantially, the Court finds that there is 
no substantial change in circumstances upon which to 
justify modification of the child support Order under § 
78-45-7.2(7), Utah Code. 
3/25/2003 Order, p. 6 (R. 207). Such a conclusion does not flow 
from the testimony presented at trial, nor does it flow from the 
subsidiary findings made by the court.7 
the child reaches the age of eighteen (18)? Did he agree to the 
increase regardless of his ability to work? What if Erich became 
physically disabled and unable to work? Did Tiffany agree that 
child support would never increase beyond the $400.00 per month. 
What if Erich began earning $100,000.00 per year? Is Tiffany 
precluded from seeking increased child support? Would Erich be 
required to pay child support beyond the guidelines based upon 
his greatly increased income? The same excess amount? A 
percentage increased amount? 
These and similar questions which depend upon the terms of 
the alleged agreement can not be answered. The agreement is 
indefinite and amorphous and so lacking in terms to be 
unenforceable. 
7
 The Utah Supreme Court, in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 
(Utah 1987) , stated that findings ""should be sufficiently 
detailed and includes enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached." Id. at 999 (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1979)). In its findings, the court below must clearly 
articulate the reasons for disregarding the Stipulation and 
Settlement Agreement. The trial court fails in this regard. 
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A. UTAH LAW ALLOWS AN ADJUSTMENT BASED UPON A SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE TO THE PARTIES' CIRCUMSTANCES: 
Utah law allows an adjustment to child support based upon a 
substantial change to the parties' circumstances. The relevant 
statute reads as follows: 
(7) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may 
at any time petition the court to adjust the amount of a 
child support order if there has been a substantial 
change in circumstances. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (7) (a) , a substantial 
change in circumstances may include: 
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or 
assets of the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income 
of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to 
earn; 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the 
child; and 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities 
of either parent for the support of others. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (7) (a)&(b) (1953 as amended). If the 
court finds such a change in the circumstances, it must "then 
determine whether the change results in a difference of 15% or 
more between the amount of child support ordered and the amount 
that would be required under the guidelines. If there is such a 
difference and the difference is not of a temporary nature, the 
court shall adjust the amount of child support ordered to that 
which is provided for in the guidelines." Id. at § 78-45-7.2 
(7) (c) . 
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B. APPLICATION TO ERICH DIENER: 
As set forth above, the Erich Diener's situation has 
substantially changed. At the time of the divorce, he was 
employed full time in the military earning approximately 
$1,700.00 gross per month (salary plus housing allowance). 
Transcript, p. 17-18. His current gross income from part-time 
work at The Gateway Academy is approximat y $1,032.00, monthly. 
The difference, is a forty percent (40%) uecrease in Mr. Diener's 
income.8 
There are additional substantial changes to Mr. Diener's 
circumstances, and his ability to earn. Mr. Diener worked 
briefly for Circuit City (Transcript, p. 18); he was employed by 
TEKsystems (Transcript, p. 18-19); he was terminated from 
TEKsystems as the result of a reduction in force (Transcript, p. 
19) ; and he has been unsuccessful locating similar employment 
without a college degree (Transcript, p. 19-21). Mr. Diener 
returned to college in pursuit of a Bachelor's Degree. 
Transcript, p. 21 & 28. As noted, he is currently employed by 
The Gateway Academy, a residential treatment center for teenage 
boys. Transcript, p. 26. He earns approximately $10.00 per hour 
8
 Including Mr. Diener's income from the Utah National 
Guard translates to a 25% decrease in income. 
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and works about 24 hours a week on the graveyard shift. 
Transcript, p. 27. 
The lower court made the following findings, comporting wi 
Mr. Diener's testimony: 
[Mr. Diener] was temporarily employed by Circuit 
City, . . . making about $1,200.00. 
[Mr. Diener] was employed by TEKsystems . . ., from 
July 1998 through September 2001 . . . . [He lost said] 
job because of the down-turn of the economy and the 
computer technology industry. 
[Mr. Diener] was unemployed from September 20 01 
through November 2 001. 
[Mr. Diener] was employed at Tucci's restaurant from 
November 2001 through October 2002, earning approximately 
$1,560.00 per month, including tips. 
* * * 
[Mr. Diener] worked on contract for TEKsystems . . 
. in 2002. He earned a total of $3,655.00 . . . . 
[Mr. Diener] has provided technical computer 
assistance and consulting to the Utah Legal Clinic in 
trade for legal services . . . [totaling $1,200.00 in 
2001 and $1,912.50 in 2002]. 
• * * 
[Mr. Diener] enlisted in the Utah National Guard in 
2002. [He] earns approximately $245.00 per month. 
[Mr. Diener] began working part-time for Gateway 
Academy . . . . * * * [His] gross income is 
approximately $1,032.00 per month . . . . 
3/25/2003 Order, p/3-4 (R. 204-205) (numbering omitted). 
Finally, the court specifically found that Mr. Diener requires 
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college degree "to again obtain gainful employment at a 
reasonable rate of pay." 3/25/2003 Order, p. 4 (R. 205). 
In spite of the evidence and the specific findings, the 
court concluded that Erich Diener's "financial circumstances have 
not changed substantially .. . ." 3/25/2003 Order, p. 6 (R. 
207). Such a conclusion is erroneous. Erich Diener's financial 
circumstances have changed substantially. His ability to earn 
has been substantially altered, and his earnings have 
significantly decreased. 
The court's erroneous conclusion may stem from Mr. Diener's 
stipulation regarding the amount to be used for the child support 
calculation. Mr. Diener stipulated that the amount of $1,750.00 
could be used for the purpose of calculating child support, if 
the court found basis for modification.9 Transcript, p. 29. The 
purpose behind Mr. Diener's stipulation was to facilitate 
settlement/resolution of this matter, and to benefit his child. 
Erich Diener testified that he did not actually earn that amount. 
Transcript, p. 29. That amount represented what he would earn jLf 
he were able to work full-time at The Gateway Academy. 
9
 By so stipulating, Mr. Diener did not waive his right to 
claim a substantial change in circumstances. He should be 
permitted to request modifications pursuant to §§ 78-45-
7.2(6)&(7)(1953 as amended). Mr. Diener did not stipulate that 
amount be used to determine whether there was a change in his 
earnings. 
28 
C. APPLICATION TO TIFFANY DIENER: 
The trial court erred in its narrow application of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45-7.2(7) (1953 as amended) solely to Erich Diener's 
financial circumstances and not the overall change in both 
parties' circumstances. There have been substantial changes in 
both parties' lives. Indeed, the lower court made specific 
findings that should have resulted in a legal conclusion that 
there are substantial changes in Tiffany Diener's circumstances. 
The court found that Ms. Diener was employed as a nanny, earning 
$1,192.00 plus room and board at the time of the divorce. 
3/25/2003 Order, p. 5. The court also found that Ms. Diener is 
now unemployed and pursuing a college degree full time. 
3/25/2003 Order, p. 5. Nevertheless, the court failed to 
conclude that there were substantial changes to Ms. Diener's 
circumstances, and thus the parties' circumstances. 
In light of the overall, substantial change in the parties' 
circumstances, the lower court erred in failing to recalculate 
child support pursuant to the guidelines. 
IV. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD CAN BE MET BY A REDUCTION OF 
CHILD SUPPORT. 
The court below found uno substantive evidence before the 
Court that reducing the child support in this matter would be in 
the best interests of the parties' minor child. 3/25/2003 Order, 
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p. 5 (R. 206). While most would agree that an increase of child 
support would always be in the best interest of the child, this 
Court must consider whether it would ever be in the best 
interests of the child to decrease child support. See generally 
Transcript, p. 80-81 ("[C]an you conceive of a situation where 
reducing someone's child support would be in the best interest of 
the child?"). 
The plain reading of §§ 75-78-45-7.2(6)&(7) (1953 as 
amended) shows that the legislature drafted the provisions with 
the intention that modifications to child support could be 
calculated to either increase or decrease. Nevertheless, there 
is some friction in §§ 75-45-7.2(6)&(7). The first section 
reads, in part, uUpon receiving a petition under Subsection 
(6)(a), the court shall, taking into account the best interests 
of the child, determine whether there is a difference between the 
amount ordered and the amount that would be required under the 
guidelines." Utah Code Ann. § 75-45-7.2(6) (b) (1953 as amended) . 
The second section reads, in part, "Upon receiving a petition 
under Subsection (7)(a), the court shall, taking into account the 
best interests of the child, determine whether a substantial 
change has occurred." Utah Code Ann. § 75-45-7.2(7) (c) (1953 as 
amended). 
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This appears to be an issue of first impression in Utah. 
Thus, an examination of states with similar statutory provisions 
is warranted. Several states have incorporated the "best 
interests of the child" standard into requirements for 
modification. See generally 16 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law 259. 
For example, in Kansas, a court may modify child support at any 
time "as required by the best interests of the child." Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 38-1121 (c). In Nevada, one may request a review 
every three (3) years. The court, may modify child support if it 
determines a modification is appropriate, while "taking into 
account the best interests of the child . . . . " . Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 125B.145. 
Florida, however, appears to be the first state to have 
specifically examined the meaning of the term "the best interests 
of the child," and allowed modification purely on that basis. In 
Florida, a court may modify child support when adjustment is 
found necessary "in the best interests of the child." Florida 
Stat. Ann. § 61.13(1)(a). 
In Wood v. Wood, 272 So.2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), the 
District Court of Appeal of Florida recognized that the Florida 
legislature had broadened the basis on which modification may be 
awarded. In Wood, an obligor father argued that an ordered 
increase in child support was unfair because there had been no 
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substantial change in the parties' circumstances. Id. The court 
rejected this argument. Id. at 15. In so doing, the appellate 
court affirmed the lower court's finding that modification was 
appropriate when necessary for the best interests of the child. 
Id. The Wood court, thus, construed § 61.13 to provide two (2) 
distinct basis to modify: 1) when necessary "for the best 
interests of the child," and 2), "when . . . there has been a 
substantial change in circumstances." Id. at 14 n.l. 
Two (2) decades later, the Florida judiciary discussed 
whether a child support reduction could be in the best interests 
of the child. In Overby v. Overby, 698 So.2d 811 (Fl. 1997) the 
obligor parent decided to attend law school, and sought to modify 
child support. Id. at 112. The children were ten (10) and (16) 
when the modification action was brought. Id. at 115. Based 
upon these facts, the court found that the decision to attend law 
school did not sustain decreased child support. Id. The Court 
reasoned that the children would be too old when the obligor 
graduated, and thus would not benefit from a potential increased 
earnings. Thus, the Overby court rejected the lower court's 
finding that it was in the "best interests of the children" to 
reduce child support. Id. 
Nevertheless, the Overby court addressed a broader issue of 
reduction in child support. The court recognized that a "need 
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for retraining when a skill is no longer needed and the need for 
increased education to enhance income [could be] important 
factors that may be considered [in reducing child support]." Id. 
Prior to Overby, the analysis to reduce child support had 
been whether a return to school, reduction in income, etc., was 
voluntary or involuntary. Id. at 814. In Overby, however, the 
Florida judiciary resolved that "the focus should be whether the 
temporary reduction will be in the best interests of the 
[child]. "10 Id. The Overby court opined that a temporary 
reduction would be permissible if the long term effect would 
benefit the children. Given the right facts, Florida courts will 
find a reduction in child support is in the best interests of the 
child if the minor child will ultimately benefit from the 
intervening factors.l:L 
Other jurisdictions, geographically closer to Utah, have not 
entirely adopted Florida's analysis. Arizona examines whether 
the parent's decision to return to school is voluntary or as the 
10
 The court affirmed, "We . . . disapprove the [previous] 
opinions . . . to the extent they rely on a voluntary/ 
involuntary rather than best interests analysis to justify or 
deny a requested reduction in child support payments." Overby, 
698 So.2d at 815. 
11 uIn light of today's fast paced changing age of tech-
nology, trial judges will have to evaluate, on a case by case 
basis, whether a temporary reduction in child support payments 
due to a payor's pursuit of an enhanced education will eventually 
be legally beneficial to the recipients." Overby, 698 So.2d at 
815. 
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result of involuntary unemployment. Little v. Little, 975 P. 2d 
108, 111 (Ariz. 1999). Nevertheless, Arizona has recognized the 
importance of a temporary modification of a child support that 
may lead to long term economic benefit for the child. Id. at 
112. In Little, the Supreme Court of Arizona found a father was 
not entitled to decreased child support when he voluntarily 
resigned a commission in the Air Force to pursue a law degree. 
Id. at 114. The court reasoned: 1) there was no evidence the 
father would earn more with a law degree, and 2) there was no 
evidence the father attempted to obtain any employment to fulfill 
his financial obligations. Id. 
Nevertheless, the court declined to adopt a strict test that 
would only look "at the earning capacity of a party in fashioning 
a support obligation." Id. at 112 (citing Lewis Becker, Spousal 
and Child Support and the "Voluntary Reduction of Income" 
Doctrine, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 647, 658 (1997)). Such a test allows 
"no consideration of the parent's individual freedom or of the 
economic benefits that can result to both parent and child from 
additional training or education." Id. 
Where a parent's voluntary decision to terminate employment 
and return to school does not place the children in peril, the 
court must consider the overall reasonableness of the parent's 
decision. Id. Given the right facts, Arizona will allow a child 
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support reduction where a parent voluntarily changes employment 
status to further education. 
Idaho, adopts a more myopic test, simply looking at whether 
the decrease in income was voluntary or involuntary. Idaho has 
declined to look toward long term benefits to the child. In 
Humberger v. Humberger, 995 P.2d 809 (Idaho 2000), the Supreme 
Court of Idaho denied a wife's petition to reduce child support. 
The court affirmed a lower court's finding that the wife was 
voluntarily unemployed based on her decision to attend college. 
Id. at 812. The wife lost a job as a waitress, and could not 
find sufficient employment to provide for herself and her two 
children. Id. at 811-812. Thus, she decided to seek a college 
degree. Id. at 812. The court did not consider the long term 
economic benefits of improved education and instead ratified a 
strict test as to whether the reduction in income was voluntary 
or involuntary. Id. 
In application herein, Erich Diener is neither voluntarily 
unemployed, nor voluntarily underemployed. Indeed, the trial 
court specifically found that Mr. Diener requires a college 
degree "to again obtain gainful employment at a reasonable rate 
of pay." 3/25/2003 Order, p. 4 (R. 205). In determining the 
best interests of the child, this Court should allow a reduction 
in child support based upon the facts herein. This Court should 
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determine that an obligor's decision to return to school might 
ultimately benefit the child, by adopting a long term view of 
greater earning capacity. In addition, involuntary unemployment 
or underemployment should not weigh against the obligor. 
V. AN INJUSTICE WILL BE PERPETRATED UPON MR. DIENER IF 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING IS ALLOWED TO STAND. 
Tiffany Diener depleted her trust account prior to the 
marriage. She asserts, however, that Erich Diener assisted in 
the depletion of that account. Pursuant to the lower court's 
ruling, Mr. Diener is ordered to pay a child support in excess of 
the guidelines perhaps until the child reaches the age of 
maj ority as *repayment." 
Based upon the trial testimony, at best the court may have 
found that Erich Diener depleted funds from Tiffany's trust in 
the amounts of $5,000.00 for tuition/plane ticket, and $2,400.00 
for the purchase of the truck.12 Tiffany Diener testified that 
Erich Diener repaid $1,2 00.00 when he sold the truck. Assuming 
arguendo Ms. Diener's account to be accurate, the most debt she 
proved at trial was $6,200.00, all incurred prior to the 
The court made no such findings. 
36 
marriage.13 Nevertheless, the lower court's order forces Mr. 
Diener to repay that debt several times over. 
Simple math demonstrates this principle. Child support is 
set at $400.00. Pursuant to the court's ruling, Mr. Diener can 
never adjust that amount. Pursuant to the Utah guidelines, and 
based upon the parties' incomes, child support should be $234.00. 
Thus, Erich Diener is paying $166.00 "extra" per month in child 
support. In roughly three (3) years, Erich will have "repaid" 
Tiffany Diener the $6,200.00 that she asserted at trial (again, 
assuming arguendo that such debts existed prior to the marriage) . 
After repayment, Tiffany Diener will be unjustly enriched by 
continued, excessive child support. No finding of the court 
supports such a scheme. A court in equity should not support 
such a scheme. An injustice will be perpetrated upon Mr. Diener 
if the lower court's ruling is allowed to stand. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The lower court erred in denying Erich Diener's request to 
modify the decree to adjust child support. Erich Diener is 
entitled to an adjustment in child support pursuant to Utah law 
after the passage of three (3) years. Furthermore, Erich Diener 
13
 No finding could be made that Erich Diener depleted the 
trust account during the marriage, because Tiffany Diener 
testified the fund was gone prior to the marriage. 
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is entitled to a modification based upon the substantial change 
in the parties' circumstances. Finally, the lower court erred in 
finding a bargained-for exchange of alimony for increased child 
support, particularly in light of the fact that no such evidence 
of said bargain is found in the parties' original divorce papers. 
The lower court should recalculate child support pursuant to 
the guidelines, based upon the parties' income, and order Erich 
Diener to pay the resulting amount. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of OCTOBER 2003. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT/APPELLANT 
/ 
by / Q^n (/h i BRIAN BARNAR: 
JAMES 11. HARRIS, Jr. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
These issues implicate important rights affecting non-
custodial parents and their child support obligations. One 
particular issue appears to be one of first impression in the 
State of Utah. Appellant believes that oral argument will give 
the parties a beneficial opportunity to explain their respective 
positions and to answer questions from the Court. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four (4) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to: 
JOHN W. CALL 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT, L.C. 
Attorneys for APPELLEE 
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ATTACHMENT A 
P e t i t i o n t o Modify (R. 4 3 ) . 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB #0215 
JAMES L. HARRIS, Jr. USB # 8204 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
214 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER, : PETITION 
TO MODIFY DECREE 
Plaintiff, . : 
vs. : Case No. 98-490-1948 DA 
ERICH ROSS DIENER, : 
Defendant. : (Hon. F. NOEL) 
THE DEFENDANT, ERICH ROSS DIENER, by and through counsel, 
Brian M. Barnard makes this Petition Seeking to Modify the Decree 
of Divorce entered herein and in support of that petition states 
as follows: 
1. The parties were divorced and a decree entered herein on 
April 17, 1998. 
2. The decree awarded to plaintiff child support for the 
one minor child of the parties at the rate of four hundred 
dollars ($400.00) per month. 
3. Since the entry of the decree, there has been a 
substantial change in the circumstances of both parties. The 
plaintiff is now unemployed and a full time student. The 
defendant was laid from his employment at Teksystems, an 
information technology and computer consulting firm. Defendant 
has been unable to find a comparable job at comparable pay. The 
defendant has taken a full time evening job anticipating that he 
will attend the University of Utah on a full-time basis beginning 
in January 2002 to earn a Bachelors of Science degree. A degree 
is necessary for defendant to re-gain comparable employment in 
the computer industry. He believes that it will take him two (2) 
years to complete the requirements for that degree. 
4. Defendant's current monthly income is $1,560.00 per 
month including tips. Plaintiff's current monthly income is -0-
per month. Based upon the foregoing, defendant's monthly child 
support obligation should be two hundred thirty-four dollars 
($234.00) per month and plaintiff's monthly child support 
obligation should be -0- per month. 
5. The decree required defendant to maintain life insurance 
on his life of $200,000.00. In light of his change in jobs such 
insurance is no longer available to defendant. The decree should 
be modified to require maintenance of such insurance only as 
available through a parties' employer. 
6. The decree required the creation and maintenance of a 
college fund for the child. Neither party has done so. In light 
of the current circumstances of the parties, the requirement to 
create and maintain such a fund should be suspended. 
7. The decree of divorce provides that the plaintiff shall 
be allowed to claim the minor child as a dependent for income tax 
purposes. In light of the other modifications as set forth 
above, the parties should be allowed to claim the child on their 
respective tax returns in alternating years: plaintiff for even 
numbered tax years and defendant for odd numbered tax years. For 
the years in which plaintiff is so allowed to claim the child, 
the defendant should be allowed to "purchase" that right from 
plaintiff. To do so, on or before March 15th of the year in 
which the tax return is due, plaintiff would calculate her taxes 
for the applicable tax year in two ways: first with claiming the 
child and the second time with her not claiming the child. 
Within ten (10) days of receipt of those two (2) tax returns, 
defendant would be allowed to purchase from the plaintiff the 
right to claim the child for that tax year, by payment of the 
amount plaintiff would "lose" by not claiming the child. Upon 
receipt of that payment, plaintiff would execute and deliver to 
the defendant, the necessary tax form to allow defendant to so 
claim the child. 
8. The decree of divorce should be modified and amended to 
recalculate defendant's child support obligations, etc. in light 
of the substantial change of circumstances of both parties. 
WHEREFORE, the decree of divorce should be modified as set 
forth above. 
Dated this 3rd day of DECEMBER 2001. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for DEFENDANT 
ERICH ROSS DIENE1T 
VERIFICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
SS 
THE ABOVE NAMED PARTY, ERICH DIENER, personally appeared 
before me, a notary public, on the date above written, and having 
been duly sworn upon oath acknowledged to me that he was the 
person that had executed that above and foregoing document, 
having read and understood it, and knowing the contents thereof, 
swearing that the contents are true, and having voluntarily 
subscribed his name thereto intending to be bound there 
Notary Public " 1 
slftWfeWBIiWi:. 
214 East axfsouth I 
^ f ^ 0 * * Utah 84111-3204 . 
My CommJMtan Hxpta* I 
October^ 2005 f 
mm ^S ta te of Utah 1 
^bfefTARY PTJB 
S t a t e of 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR MODIFICATION to: 
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER 
Plaintiff PRO SE 
1464 University Village 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
on the 3RD day of DECEMBER 2001, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service. 
C:\Domestic\DIENERraod PET.wpd/BMB 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
M 
ATTACHMENT B 
Findings of Fac t , Conclus ions of Law 
and Order (R. 202) . 
JOHN W. CALL, USB #0542 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT, L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner Tiffany 
Jacobs Diener 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
Facsimile: (801) 364-6403 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 5 2003 
°v^p ALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Cierk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER, 
Petitioner, 
ERICH ROSS DIENER, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Civil No. 984901948 DA 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Commissioner Michael Evans 
Defendant Erich Ross Diener's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came on for trial 
on February 6,2003 before the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge presiding. Petitioner 
was present and represented by his attorney, Brian M. Barnard. The Respondent, Tiffany 
Jacobs Diener, was present and represented by her attorney, John W. Call. Each of the parties 
had submitted a trial memorandum prior to trial which memoranda were reviewed by the 
Court. The Court heard argument and the testimony of the parties. Therefore, being thus 
duly advised in the premises, the Court hereby makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Prior to Ms. Diener's filing of the Petition for Divorce in this matter, she and Mr. 
Diener agreed that the Mr. Diener would pay child support in the amount of $400, which both 
parties knew was higher than the child support guidelines. 
2. The higher child support amount was a bargained-for consideration where each 
of the parties made significant concessions in reaching that agreement. Ms. Diener agreed not 
to pursue claims for alimony or additional property settlement, based upon Mr. Diener's use 
of Ms. Dienerrs pre-marital assets, and Mr. Diener agreed to pay a higher monthly child 
support amount in order to be relieved of the risk of such claims by Ms. Diener being 
successful. 
3. The parties were divorced and a Decree entered herein by stipulation on April 
17,1998. More than three (3) years have elapsed since entry of the decree. The Court takes 
judicial notice of the parties' settlement stipulation filed herein and dated March 23,1998. 
4. Paragraph 3 of the Decree awarded to Plaintiff child support for the one minor 
child of the parties at the rate of four hundred dollars ($400.00) per month. The child support 
awarded in the original decree exceeded the Utah Child Support Guidelines. 
5. Although Mr. Diener earned as much as $55,000.00 annually since the divorce 
was granted, Mr. Diener agreed that his present income may be imputed to be $1,750 per 
month for the purposes of child support, slightly greater than the $1,700 per month income 
he was receiving at the time of the parties' divorce. 
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6. Defendant was temporarily employed by Circuit City as a computer sales person 
making about $1,200.00 gross per month from April 1998 through June 1998. 
7. Defendant was employed by TEKsystems, an information technology and 
computer consulting firm, from June 1998 through September 2001. Defendant was hired at 
$12.00 per hour. In September 2001, a reduction in force occurred and the Defendant was laid 
off. The Defendant's salary at that time was $55,000.00 annually. He lost that job because of 
the down-turn of the economy and the computer technology industry. 
8. Defendant was unemployed from September 2001 through November 2001. 
9. Despite searching, Defendant has been unable to find employment with income 
comparable to TEKsystems. 
10. Defendant was employed by Tucci's restaurant from November 2001 through 
October 2002 earning approximately $1,560.00 per month including tips. Defendant was hired 
as a part-time bartender earning $7.25 per hour plus tips (income averaged to be $10.00 per 
hour). The Defendant worked approximately 15 hours per week. Defendant also tried to pick 
up additional hours (15-20 hours per week) as a server at which he earned a similar hourly 
rate. Defendant took this job because it allowed him to attend the University of Utah during 
the day. 
11. Defendant worked on contract for TEKsystems for approximately 20 hours a 
week for a few months in 2002. He earned a total of $ 3,655.00 from TEKsystems in 2002. On 
a part-time basis, he helped with the installation of a computer system. 
^t>M 
12. Defendant has provided technical computer assistance and consulting to Utah 
Legal Clinic in trade for legal services in representing Defendant in this action. Credit has 
been given at the rate of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per hour for work performed. For the 
year 2001, as an independent contractor, Defendant provided a total of $1,200.00 in services 
to Utah Legal Clinic. For the year 2002, Defendant provided a total of $1,912.50 in services 
to Utah Legal Clinic. Internal Revenue Service form 1099fs have been provided to Defendant 
by Utah Legal Clinic in those amounts for those years. 
13. Defendant enlisted with the Utah National Guard in 2002. His work obligation 
is one (1) weekend per month. Defendant earns approximately $245.00 gross per month from 
the guard. 
14. Defendant began working part-time for Gateway Academy on January 26,2003 
as a Milieu Manager. He supervises teenagers in a residential facility. The Defendant is 
working approximately 24 hours per week and is working the graveyard shift. The Defendant 
is earning $10.00 per hour. The Defendant's gross income is approximately $1,032.00 per 
month ($10.00 x 24 hrs. x 4.3 weeks = $1,032.00). Defendant has no benefits, no insurance, etc. 
from that employment. 
15. Defendant is and has been a full time student at the University of Utah since 
January 2002 working towards a Bachelors degree. A degree is necessary for Defendant to 
again obtain gainful employment at a reasonable rate of income. The current plan is that he 
will complete his degree in the Spring of 2004. 
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16. Ms. Diener is now unemployed and a full time University of Utah student and 
currently earns no income. Plaintiff is capable of employment. Her plan is to complete her 
degree in approximately two (2) years. The parties' child, Zoe is in elementary school and 
attends school for a full school day. 
17. Ms. Diener was earning $1,192.00 per month and receiving free room and board 
for herself and her daughter for work as a nanny when the divorce Decree was entered. 
18. There is no substantive evidence before the Court that reducing the child 
support in this matter would be in the best interest of the parties' minor child. 
19. Since the Decree of Divorce was entered, the parties have made little 
contribution to a college fund for the parties' minor child. 
WHEREFORE, having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Because the parties made concessions and bargained for a higher child support 
amount prior to the divorce, and because Mr. Dienerfs imputed income is slightly greater than 
his income at the time the divorce was granted, it would be inequitable to apply the provisions 
of § 78-45-7.2(6), Utah Code, to reduce Mr. Diener's child support obligation, inasmuch as 
doing so would provide Mr. Diener with the benefits of the bargain without requiring its 
corresponding obligations. 
2. Because the Defendant's financial circumstances have not changed substantially, 
the Court finds that there is no substantial change in circumstances upon which to justify 
modification of the child support Order under § 78-45-7.2(7), Utah Code. 
3. There are insufficient changes in the parties' relative income earning ability to 
justify permitting Mr. Diener to claim the parties' minor child as a dependent for tax 
deduction purposes in alternating years. However, it would be equitable, and Ms. Diener has 
agreed, to modify the Decree to allow Mr. Diener to purchase the right from Ms. Diener the 
right to the child's dependent tax deduction in each tax year that he wishes to do so by first 
paying to Ms. Diener sufficient funds to compensate her for any greater tax burden as a result 
of her not being able to use the tax deduction in that year. 
4. The Court finds that it would be equitable to modify the Decree that the parties 
be required to obtain life insurance coverage for their lives for the benefit of the parties' minor 
child, but only if it is available from their employers at reasonable cost. 
5. The Court finds that it would be equitable to modify the Decree to suspend the 
provision in the Decree of Divorce that requires a 5% contribution of the parties' income to 
a college fund for the benefit of the parties' minor child. 
6. The Court finds that it would be fair and equitable that each of the parties be 
required to bear their own attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, the Court, having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, hereby orders as follows: 
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1. Mr. Diener's Petition to Modify the child support provisions of Paragraph 3 of 
the Decree of Divorce is hereby denied. 
2. Mr. Diener's Petition to Modify the tax deduction provisions of Paragraph 14 
of the Decree of Divorce is denied as to his request regarding alternating years. However, it 
is hereby ordered that Paragraph 14 is modified to allow Mr. Diener to purchase the right to 
take the tax deduction in each tax year that he wishes to do so by first paying to Ms. Diener 
the sufficient funds to compensate her for any greater tax burden as a result of her not being 
able to use the tax deduction in that year. 
3. Mr. Diener's Petition to Modify the Decree in order to suspend the requirement 
in Paragraph 7 that the parties contribute a percentage of their income to a college fund 
account is hereby granted. 
4. Mr. Dienerfs Petition to Modify Paragraph 5 of the Decree regarding the 
maintenance of life insurance coverage is hereby granted. Each party is now required to 
obtain such life insurance, for the purposes and in the amounts stated in Paragraph 5 of the 
Decree, only if it is available from the parties' employers at a reasonable cost. 
5. Each party is to bear their own costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein. 
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2.b 
/ 
DATED this I/O day of / W / f r l A . , 2003. 
Aj/ (V^ BY THE COURT 
AA; 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order this y7* day of March, 2003, by U. S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Brian M. Barnard 
James L. Harris, Jr. 
Utah Legal Clinic 
Attorneys for Respondent Erich Ross Diener 
214 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304 
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ATTACHMENT C 
Decree of D i v o r c e (R. 3 3 ) . 
Marilynn Burningham (#4571) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
hird Judicial District 
APR 1 7 1998 
T LAKE COUNTY ~ -SAL
By Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ERIC ROSS DIENER, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 984901948DA 
Judge Frank Noel 
The parties have entered into a Stipulation providing that Eric's default be entered and 
Tiffany awarded a Decree of Divorce pursuant to its terms. The Court has entered Eric's default, 
reviewed the records, files and papers in this matter and received the testimony of Tiffany as to 
jurisdiction and grounds. Having received Tiffany's testimony that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce conform to the parties' Stipulation, and having entered 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. The bonds of matrimony between the parties are dissolved, and Tiffany is* awarded 
a Decree of Divorce from Eric to become final upon entry by the Court. 
78859.DI210.001 
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2. Tiffany and Eric are awarded joint legal custody of the parties' minor child, Zoe-
Nicene, born February 19, 1995. Tiffany is awarded physical custody of the child, and Eric is 
awarded liberal rights of visitation. In addition: 
(a) It is ordered that the parties exchange information concerning the health, 
education and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions 
concerning any of these areas. 
(b) It is ordered that each party have direct access to all school reports and 
medical records and be notified immediately by the other party in the event of a medical 
emergency. 
(c) It is ordered that each party provide the other with a current address and 
telephone number within 24 hours of any change. 
(d) It is ordered that each party permit and encourage liberal telephone contact 
during reasonable hours. 
3. Tiffany is awarded child support in the amount of $400.00 per month, to be paid each 
month until Zoe attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last. 
The child support exceeds that of the Utah Child Support Guidelines, as computed from Eric's 
income of $1,700.00 per month and Tiffany's income of $1,192.00 per month. 
4. Petitioner is ordered to obtain and maintain health, dental and accident insurance for 
the benefit of the parties' minor child. The parties are ordered to share equally all out-of-pocket 
costs for insurance premiums, deductibles, co-payments, and any medical and dental costs for the 
minor child which are not covered by insurance. It is ordered that the party who incurs medical and 
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dental expenses for the benefit of the minor child provide to the other written verification of the 
expense incurred within 30 days. The receiving party is ordered to make payment of one-half the 
expense incurred within 30 days of receipt of notification that the expense has been incurred. 
5. The parties are each ordered to maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of the 
minor child in the face amount of $200,000.00 for Respondent and $100,000.00 for Petitioner. Each 
party is ordered to provide verification that the policy is in force, upon request of the other. It is 
ordered that, until the parties' minor child reaches the age of 18 years, each party designate the other 
as beneficiary on said life insurance policy, as trustee for the minor child. 
6. The parties agree that the primary and secondary school education of their daughter 
is of paramount importance to each of them. Thus, it is ordered that extra costs incurred for 
extracurricular activities or enrichment programs be shared equally. 
7. It is ordered that, each year until Zoe-Nicene reaches the age of 18 years, each party 
contribute five percent (5%) of that party's gross annual income to an account to be used for Zoe's 
post-secondary educational expenses. It is ordered that these annual contributions not be withdrawn 
or disbursed until the parties and Zoe agree. 
8. The parties are able-bodied and able to provide for their own support, and it is ordered 
that neither party pay alimony to the other. 
9. It is ordered that each party be responsible to maintain that party's medical and dental 
insurance coverage, and that each be responsible for that party's uninsured medical and dental costs. 
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10. The parties have divided the personal property acquired during the marriage in an 
equitable fashion, and each party is awarded the personal property currently in that party's 
possession. 
11. Each party is awarded that party's checking and savings accounts and such retirement 
or other assets as have been accumulated in that party's name. 
12. Each party is ordered to assume and pay all debts and obligations incurred by that 
party since their separation on November 24,1997, and to hold the other harmless from any liability 
thereon. In addition, it is ordered that Petitioner assume and pay the following: 
R.C. Willey 
Nordstrom Account $ 200.00 
Discover Card $1,900.00 
Citibank Card $ 500.00 
AAFES $ 750.00 
It is ordered that Respondent assume and pay the following: 
Overdraft, America First $ 500.00 
Computer Loan $3,000.00 
Visa Card $3,500.00 
AAFES $ 750.00 
Nordstrom Account $ 300.00 
13. The parties have acquired two vehicles, subject to the balance due on the financing 
loan from Weber State Credit Union: Petitioner's 1995 Passat and Respondent's 1994 Toyota truck. 
Each party is ordered to obtain financing on the vehicle on which that party is the sole obligor. It 
is ordered that the parties obtain separate financing within 21 days of the signing of this Agreement 
and the Weber State Credit Union loan, which currently has a balance of approximately $30,000.00, 
be paid in full. 
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14. It is ordered that Petitioner be entitled to claim the minor child as an exemption for 
federal and state income tax purposes. 
15. Respondent is ordered to assume and pay any additional tax liability arising from 
transactions occurring or returns filed jointly by the parties during the marriage. 
16. The parties are ordered to execute such documents as may be necessary to transfer 
the property as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto. 
17. Each party is ordered to pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by that party. 
DATED this / ( day of / W r p ^ A N , 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this , 3 / ^ d a y of March, 1998,1 did cause a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DECREE to be mailed, United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed to the 
following: 
Eric Ross Diener 
9828 Emory Road 
Fort Mead, Maryland 70755 
'TMJ&AAMMA^^ 
78859 DI210 001 
*l V 
ATTACHMENT D 
St ipu l a t i on and Settlement Agreement (R. 10) . 
Marilynn Burningham (#4571) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
ERIC ROSS DTENER, ] 
Respondent. ] 
) STIPULATION AND 
) SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
) Civil No. 984901948DA 
) Judge Frank Noel 
Come now the parties and make the following stipulations and agreements for the purpose 
of settlement of this action and respectfully move the Court to adopt the stipulations and agreements 
in the final decree of divorce to be entered herein: 
DIVORCE 
1. Petitioner shall proceed to obtain a decree of divorce from Respondent dissolving the 
marriage of the parties on the grounds of their irreconcilable differences, to become final upon entry 
by the Court. 
2. Respondent has executed an Acceptance of Service and consents that his default may 
be entered pursuant to the terms of this Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement and that this 
matter may proceed at a time convenient to the Court and counsel. 
78551 FI588 010 
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3. Petitioner is a bona fide and actual resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
has been a resident for more than three months prior to the commencement of this action. 
4. Petitioner and Respondent and wife and husband, respectively, having been legally 
married on July 2, 1994, in Layton, Davis County, State of Utah. 
5. Disagreements have ensued between the parties concerning their marriage and their 
future together; meaningful communication between the parties has ceased; and, notwithstanding 
attempts by the parties to reconcile and resolve their differences, continuation of the marriage under 
the circumstances has become impossible. 
CUSTODY. 
6. The parties have one minor child born as issue of their marriage: Zoe-Nicene Lois 
Diener, born February 19,1995, age 3 years. 
7. This Court has jurisdiction to enter an order of custody pursuant to the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)(b) (1987). 
8. The parties are fit and proper persons to have joint legal custody of the minor child. 
Petitioner shall be the primary physical custodial of the child, subject to Respondent's liberal 
visitation. In addition: 
(a) The parties shall exchange information concerning the health, education and 
welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions concerning any of 
these areas. 
(b) Each party shall have direct access to all school reports and medical records 
and shall be notified immediately by the other party in the event of a medical emergency. 
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(c) Each party shall provide the other with a current address and telephone 
number within 24 hours of any change. 
(d) Each party shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during 
reasonable hours. 
CHILD SUPPORT AND RELATED PROVISIONS. .Ac± 
9. Petitioneris currently employed earning $14,300.00 per year, or $1,192.00 per month, joqetrl&Y' 
Respondent is currently serving in the Armed Forces earning $20,400.00 per year, or $ 1,700.00 per ^ 
month, together with an allowance for housing and other benefits. 
10. The parties agree that Respondent shall pay to Petitioner the sum of $400.00 as base 
child support, to be paid each month until Zoe-Nicene attains the age of 18 years or graduates from 
high school, whicheverjaccurs last. 
f 1. Respondent shall obtain and maintain health, dental and accident insurance for the 
benefit of the parties' minor child. The parties shall share equally all out-of-pocket costs for 
insurance premiums, deductibles, co-payments, and any medical and dental costs for the minor child 
which are not covered by insurance. The party who incurs medical and dental expenses for the 
benefit of the minor child shall provide to the other written verification of the expense incurred 
within 30 days. The receiving party shall make payment of one-half the expense incurred within 30 
days of receipt of notification that the expense has been incurred. 
12. The parties shall each maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of the minor 
child in the face amount of $200,000.00 for Respondent and $100,000.00 for Petitioner. Each party 
shall provide verification that the policy is in force, upon request of the other. Until the parties' 
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minor child reaches the age of 18 years, each party shall designate the other as beneficiary on said 
life insurance policy, as trustee for the minor child. 
13. The parties agree that the primary and secondary school education of their daughter 
is of paramount importance to each of them. Thus, the parties agree that extra costs incurred for 
extracurricular activities or enrichment programs will be shared equally. 
14. The parties agree that, each year until Zoe-Nicene reaches the age of 18 years, each 
party will contribute five percent (5%) of that party's gross annual income to an account to be used 
for Zoe's post-secondary educational expenses. The parties agree that these annual contributions 
shall not be withdrawn or disbursed until the parties and Zoe agree. 
ALIMONY AND RELATED PROVISIONS. 
15. This is a brief marriage of 3-1/2 years duration. The parties are able-bodied and able 
to provide for their own support and neither shall pay alimony to the other. 
16. Each party shall be responsible to maintain that party's medical and dental insurance 
coverage, and each shall be responsible for that party's uninsured medical and dental costs. 
PROPERTY AND DEBT DISTRIBUTION. 
17. The parties have divided the personal property acquired during the marriage in an 
equitable fashion and each party is awarded the personal property currently in that party's possession. 
18. Each party shall be awarded that party's checking and savings accounts, and such 
retirement or other assets as have been accumulated in that party's name. 
19. Each party shall assume and pay all debts and obligations incurred by that party since 
their separation on November 24, 1997, and hold the other harmless from any liability thereon. In 
addition, Petitioner shall assume and pay the following: 
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R.C. Willey 
Nordstrom Account $ 200.00 
Discover Card $1,900.00 
Citibank Card $ 500.00 
AAFES $ 750.00 
Respondent shall assume and pay the following: 
Computer Loan $3,000.00 ' ' 
Visa Card $3,500.00 
AAFES $ 750.00 
Nordstrom Account $ 300.00 
20. The parties have acquired two vehicles, subject to the balance due on the financing 
loan from Weber State Credit Union: Petitioner's 1995 Passat and Respondent's 1994 Toyota truck. 
The parties agree that each will obtain financing on which that party is the sole obligor. The parties 
agree to obtain separate financing within 21 days of the signing of this Agreement and the Weber 
State Credit Union loan, which currently has a balance of approximately $30,000.00, shall be paid 
in full. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS. 
21. Petitioner shall be entitled to claim the minor child as an exemption for federal and 
state income tax purposes. 
22. Respondent agrees to assume and pay any additional tax liability arising from 
transactions occurring or returns filed jointly by the parties during the marriage. 
23. Each party shall assume and pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by each in this 
action. 
24. The parties shall execute such documents as may be necessary to transfer the property 
as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto. 
78551.FI588.010 -5-
2 5. The parties have folly and accurately disclosed in this Agreement all real and personal 
property in which they have an interest, all debts for which they are liable and their incomes. The 
parties also represent that they have made no transfer or distribution of any funds or property to any 
third party except in the course of typical and reasonable living and business expenses. 
26. The parties represent that, prior to the execution of this Agreement, they reviewed 
and discussed its terms with their respective counsel, as deemed necessary, and that they believe the 
Agreement is a fair and equitable distribution of the assets acquired and liabilities incurred by the 
parties. 
DATED this of March, 1998. 
On this J(3 day of March, 1998, personally appeared before me TIFFANY JACOBS 
DIENER, who, after being duly swom and upon her oath, deposes and states that she has read the 
foregoing Agreement, knows and understands its contents, and states that the same is true to the best 
of her knowledge and that she executes this document as a free and voluntary act for its stated 
purpose. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ANITA MAJOR 
60 East South Temple #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
My Commission Expires 
February 2i , 1999 
STATE OF UTAH 
$4u£& /&< 
Notary Public 
££2L_ 
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DATED this^l day of March, 1998. 
Eric Ross Diener 
On this ZZ day of March, 1998, personally appeared before me ERIC ROSS DIENER, 
who, after being duly sworn and upon his oath, deposes and states that he has read the foregoing 
Agreement, knows and understands its contents, and states that the same is true to the best of his 
knowledge and that he executes this document as a free and voluntary act for its stated purpose. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
BOYD F.BUTLER 
3333 So. 900 E. #100 
S.LC., UT 84106 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
MAY 10,2001 
STATE OF UTAH 
-2 C % ^ - L^gfc, 
Notary Public 
78551.H588.010 -7- \L 
ATTACHMENT E 
Original Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law (R. 26) . 
' " '"^icial District 
APR 1 7 
Marilynn Burningham (#4571) . 
NIELSEN * SENIOR, P.C. ^ ^ K S Paj f^ 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 ~ ^ ^ ^ ^-HU<X<4&n 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIFFANY JACOBS DIENER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ERIC ROSS DIENER, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 984901948DA 
Judge Frank Noel 
The parties to this action, Petitioner Tiffany Jacobs Diener ("Tiffany") and Respondent Eric 
Ross Diener ("Eric"), have entered into a Stipulation providing that Eric's default be entered and 
Tiffany awarded a Decree of Divorce pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation. The Court has 
reviewed the records and papers on file and has received, by affidavit, the testimony of Tiffany as 
to jurisdiction and grounds and that the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce conform to the Stipulation of the parties. Being fully advised in the premises, the Court 
enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Tiffany is a bona fide and actual resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and has 
been such for more than three months prior to the commencement of this action. 
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2. Tiffany and Eric are wife and husband, having been married on July 2, 1994, in 
Layton, Davis County, State of Utah. 
3. Disagreements have ensued between the parties concerning their marriage and their 
future together; meaningful communication between the parties has ceased; notwithstanding attempts 
by the parties to reconcile and resolve their differences, the same have been unsuccessful; and, the 
disagreements have become irreconcilable, making continuation of the marriage under the 
circumstances impossible. 
4. One child has been born as issue of the marriage, namely, Zoe-Nicene Lois, bom 
February 19, 1995. 
5. This Court has jurisdiction to enter an order of custody pursuant to the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)(b) (1987). 
6. Both parties are fit and proper persons to have the care, custody and control of Zoe-
Nicene, and it is fair and reasonable that they be awarded joint legal custody. Tiffany should be the 
primary physical custodian of the child, subject to Eric's liberal rights of visitation. In addition: 
(a) It is fair and reasonable that the parties exchange information concerning the 
health, education and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making 
decisions concerning any of these areas. 
(b) It is fair and reasonable that each party have direct access to all school reports 
and medical records and be notified immediately by the other party in the event of a medical 
emergency. 
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(c) It is fair and reasonable that each party provide the other with a current 
address and telephone number within 24 hours of any change. 
(d) It is fair and reasonable that each party permit and encourage liberal telephone 
contact during reasonable hours. 
7. Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties, it is fair and reasonable that Tiffany be 
awarded child support in the amount of $400.00 per month, to be paid each month until Zoe reaches 
the age of 18 years or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last. The child support exceeds 
that of the child support guidelines, as computed jfrom Eric's income of $1,700.00 per month and 
Tiffany's income of $1,192.00 per month. 
8. It is fair and reasonable that Petitioner obtain and maintain health, dental and accident 
insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor child. It is fair and reasonable that the parties share 
equally all out-of-pocket costs for insurance premiums, deductibles, co-payments, and any medical 
and dental costs for the minor child which are not covered by insurance. It is fair and reasonable that 
the party who incurs medical and dental expenses for the benefit of the minor child provide to the 
other written verification of the expense incurred within 30 days. It is fair and reasonable that the 
receiving party make payment of one-half the expense incurred within 30 days of receipt of 
notification that the expense has been incurred. 
9. It is fair and reasonable that the parties each maintain a life insurance policy for the 
benefit of the minor child in the face amount of $200,000.00 for Respondent and $100,000.00 for 
Petitioner. It is fair and reasonable that each party provide verification that the policy is in force, 
upon request of the other. It is fair and reasonable that, until the parties' minor child reaches the age 
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of 18 years, each party designate the other as beneficiary on said life insurance policy, as trustee for 
the minor child. 
10. The parties have agreed that the primary and secondary school education of their 
daughter is of paramount importance to each of them. Thus, it is fair and reasonable that extra costs 
incurred for extracurricular activities or enrichment programs be shared equally. 
11. Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties, it is fair and reasonable that, each year until 
Zoe-Nicene reaches the age of 18 years, each party contribute five percent (5%) of that party's gross 
annual income to an account to be used for Zoe's post-secondary educational expenses. It is fair and 
reasonable that these annual contributions not be withdrawn or disbursed until the parties and Zoe 
agree, 
12. The parties are able-bodied and able to provide for their own support, and it is fair 
and reasonable that neither party pay alimony to the other. 
13. It is fair and reasonable that each party be responsible to maintain that party's medical 
and dental insurance coverage, and that each be responsible for that party's uninsured medical and 
dental costs. 
14. The parties have divided the personal property acquired during the marriage in an 
equitable fashion, and it is fair and reasonable that each party be awarded the personal property 
currently in that party's possession. 
15. It is fair and reasonable that each party be awarded that party's checking and savings 
accounts and such retirement or other assets as have been accumulated in that party's name. 
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16. It is fair and reasonable that each party assume and pay all debts and obligations 
incurred by that party since their separation on November 24, 1997, and hold the other harmless 
from any liability thereon. In addition, it is fair and reasonable that Petitioner assume and pay the 
following: 
R.C. Willey 
Nordstrom Account $ 200.00 
Discover Card $1,900.00 
Citibank Card $ 500.00 
AAFES $ 750.00 
It is fair and reasonable that Respondent assume and pay the following: 
Overdraft, America First $ 500.00 
Computer Loan $3,000.00 
Visa Card $3,500.00 
AAFES $ 750.00 
Nordstrom Account $ 300.00 
17. The parties have acquired two vehicles, subject to the balance due on the financing 
loan from Weber State Credit Union: Petitioner's 1995 Passat and Respondent's 1994 Toyota truck. 
It is fair and reasonable that each party obtain financing on the vehicle on which that party is the sole 
obligor. It is fair and reasonable that the parties obtain separate financing within 21 days of the 
signing of this Agreement and the Weber State Credit Union loan, which currently has a balance of 
approximately $30,000.00, be paid in fall. 
18. It is fair and reasonable that Petitioner be entitled to claim the minor child as an 
exemption for federal and state income tax purposes. 
19. It is fair and reasonable that Respondent assume and pay any additional tax liability 
arising from transactions occurring or returns filed jointly by the parties during the marriage. 
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20. It is fair and reasonable that the parties execute such documents as may be necessary 
to transfer the property as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto. 
21. It is fair and reasonable that each party pay the attorney fees and costs incurred by 
that party. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties in this matter, and Tiffany is entitled to 
a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
2. A Decree of Divorce shall be entered, consistent with the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED this / ( day of / V ^ ^ r > ^ X ^ 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this , ? r f day of March, 1998,1 did cause a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be mailed, United 
States mails, postage prepaid, addressed to the followmg: 
Eric Ross Diener 
9828 Emory Road 
Fort Mead, Maryland 70755 
WJMlA/i/y?yf/!Mkaw) 
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